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BEACH EROSION AND HURRICANE
PROTECTION IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT: THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS AS A
GOVERNMENT NEMESIS
Barbara Affeldt t
One of the world's most spectacular sand beaches runs from New
England down the Atlantic coast, winding around Florida to reach
along the northern edge of the Gulf of Mexico. Much of the 2, 700-mile
beach lies on the 295 "barrier islands" that stand between the sea and
the mainland along the two coasts. Both the mainland beaches and the
islands are under constant attack from the sea, which sometimes builds
them up, sometimes tears them down[,] and continuously reshapes them.
The early inhabitants of the shore zone, recognizing that the coast
has always been a hazardous place for people, settled on the bay side of
the barrier islands, as far inland from the beach as possible. Construc-
tion was also kept well back of the mainland beaches. Over the past
several decades that pattern has been reversed. Construction now takes
place as close as possible to the shoreline. Today such resorts as Atlantic
City, Ocean City, Virginia Beach, Hilton Head, Jekyll Island, Miami
Beach[,] and Galveston Island occupy barrier islands, and summer
homes crowd many of the beaches. Naturally pressure for public works to
protect the islands and beaches is strong.'
I. INTRODUCTION
A vigorous debate over the government's proper role in beach
erosion and hurricane protection exists. There are those who be-
lieve that men and women can never win the battle against nature,
and any attempts to inhibit the natural process of erosion of our
nation's shorelines are economically illogical.2 If shore restoration
t J.D., 1997, The City University of New York School of Law. M.S., 1989, Ithaca
College; B.S., 1986, University of Massachusetts. The opinions expressed herein rep-
resent the personal views of the author and do not, in any way, reflect the views of the
United States Department of Justice, the United States Department of the Army, or
any other government agency.
I Robert Dolan & Harry Lins, Beaches and Barrier Islands, 257 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN
68 (July 1987).
2 See, e.g., BARRIER BEACH PRESERVATION ASSOCIATION, THE WESTHAMPTON BEACH
EROSION PROBLEM: NATURE VS[.] SHORTSIGHTED MAN (July 1984); Joe Demma, Ban on
Building at Shore Asked, Klein Seeks to Halt Construction That Causes Erosion Along the
Ocean and L.I. Sound, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Mar. 28, 1973, at 3; Mitchell R. Freed-
man & Donald Meyers, Beach Erosion Danger, Klein Blasts 'Houses in Teeth of Atlantic,'
LONG ISLAND PRESS, Mar. 28, 1973, at 1; Robert Fresco, Klein Expands Beach-Control
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projects are initiated, a related issue is whether the direct benefi-
ciaries of these projects should contribute their fair and appropri-
ate share of the overall costs. This issue may be the primary
underlying factor that stimulates criticism of many projects.' In-
deed, because beachfront property is coveted and usually expen-
sive to own, there is a perception that beach nourishment4 projects
are government "gifts" to the wealthy.5 But there are those who
assert that government intervention is critical in preserving United
States shorelines for the beneficial use and enjoyment of all its citi-
zens.6 As the debate over shore restoration projects continues, a
principal public policy issue is the appropriate cost shares for fed-
eral and nonfederal (i.e., state and local) contributions to these
projects.
7
This article proposes one explanation for the decreased sup-
port for federal participation in shore restoration-the continually
Plan, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Mar. 29, 1973, at 7;Jane Snider, Groins Unwanted, Klein
Tells Army, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Oct. 25, 1974, at 7; Hope Spencer &Jim Scovel,
Waves Leave Ruin, Controversy, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Mar. 24, 1973, at 3.
3 COMMITTEE ON BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, NATIONAL RESEARCH
COUNCIL, BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION 43 (1995) [hereinafter BEACH NOUR-
ISHMENT AND PROTECTION].
4 Beachfill or nourishment is the process by which beach-compatible sand is
dredged from the bed of a waterbody and pumped onto the beach to provide hurri-
cane protection and beach erosion-control.
5 BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 43.
6 See generally American Shore and Beach Preservation Association, Position Pa-
per, On a Federal Policy for Shore Protection, 64 SHORE & BEACH 3 (Oct. 1996).
Congress concluded that beach erosion and hurricane protection was important
when it charged the United States Army Corps of Engineers (the "Corps") with pri-
mary responsibility in this area, Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, 33
U.S.C. §§ 401, 403, 404, 406-09, 411-16, 418, 502, 549, 686, 687 (1993), which neces-
sarily included the allocation of government funds. R. Anne Sudar et. al., Shore Protec-
tion Projects of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 63 Shore & Beach 3 (Apr. 1995). In the
public's perception as well, beach preservation is of importance, and worth the alloca-
tion of resources. See BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 14. "Liv-
ing at or near a coastline, particularly one with a sandy beach, is highly prized.
[Indeed, there has been] a marked escalation in coastal population growth and in the
value of land in many coastal areas." BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, supra
note 3, at 14. A 1994 report by the U.S. Army Institute for Water Resources shows that
federal spending on erosion control has been small, and has been cost-effective.
SHORELINE PROTECTION AND BEACH EROSION CONTROL TASK FORCE, U.S. ARMY CORPS
OF ENGINEERS, SHORELINE PROTECTION AND BEACH EROSION CONTROL STUDY: PHASE I:
COST COMPARISON OF SHORELINE PROTECTION PROJECTS OF THE U.S. taRMY CORPS OF
ENGINEERS, IWR Report 94-PS-1 (Jan. 1994) [hereinafter SHORELINE PROTECTION AND
BEACH EROSION CONTROL TASK FORCE] (the results of this report were published in R.
Anne Sudar et. al., supra at Ch. 3). In addition, "some beaches are recognized as
having significant environmental value as habitats for a wide range of marine life,
including threatened or endangered species." BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION,
supra note 3, at 14.
7 BEACH NOURISHMENT AND PROTECTION, supra note 3, at 43.
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rising costs of litigation over government-sponsored projects. The
focus of this article is an analysis of recent litigation concerning
beach restoration in the Second Circuit, particularly on Long Is-
land's south shore. The Second Circuit labeled construction and
maintenance of one particular government project in this area a
continuing tort, tolling the statute of limitations. This ruling ex-
poses the government to litigation concerning this project indefi-
nitely. As a result, the government will be forced to abandon
future shore protection projects and spend those funds on perpet-
ual litigation. The practical effect is that government intervention
to protect this nation's shorelines will cease.
II. BACKGROUND
The mission of the United States Army Corps of Engineers
(the "Corps") is to "provid[e] quality, responsive engineering serv-
ices to the nation."8 To carry out this mission, the Corps presently
employs nearly 37,000 Americans worldwide.9 The Corps' New
York District is one of five districts within its North Atlantic Divi-
sion." The New York District oversees projects in an eight state
region (Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New
Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont) as well as Green-
land."1 The area within the boundaries of the New York District
has the largest civilian population of any of the other districts,
12
and nearly twenty percent of all congressional members have con-
stituents within this area. 3
The Corps provides engineering and related services in four
areas: water and natural resource management (civil works), mili-
tary construction and support, engineering research and develop-
ment, and support to other government agencies.' 4 One of the
8 N.Y. DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, COMMAND BRIEFING 1 (1995)
[hereinafter COMMAND BRIEFING] (available from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
N.Y. District, Executive Office, Room 2100, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
9 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, SERVICE TO THE NATION: THE SPIRIT OF THE
CoRPS (n.d.).
10 Recently, Congress directed the Corps to reduce the number of its divisions to
no more than eight and no fewer than six. Energy and Water Development Appropri-
ations Act, 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-206, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. (110 Stat. 2984) 2989. See
Divisions Restructure, ENGINEER UPDATE, Apr. 1997, at 1.
11 N.Y. DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, A GUIDE TO SERVICES 13 (1989)
[hereinafter A GUIDE TO SERVICES] (available from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
N.Y. District, Office of Public Affairs, Room 2108, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y.
10278).
12 Id. at 1.
13 COMMAND BRIEFING, supra note 8, at 2-3.
14 U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, NATION BUILDERS 2 (n.d.) (available from the
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Corps' primary civil works missions is the control of beach erosion
and hurricane protection.' 5 Corps projects protect the nation's sea
and lake shores from storm damage, but also reduce, or in some
cases replace, losses from coastal erosion. 6 In the civil works area,
the New York District is responsible for activities in the watershed
areas of the Hudson River Basin and Lake Champlain, the Atlantic
coasts of New Jersey and New York, the Hackensack, Passaic, and
Raritan River Basins in New Jersey, and New York Harbor.17
One project undertaken by the New York District, designed to
control beach erosion and hurricane damage on the south shore
of Long Island, is the Fire Island Inlet to Montauk Point, Long Island,
New York Beach Erosion and Hurricane Project.18 Increasing erosion in
this area has long been of particular concern due to occurrences of
major hurricanes and severe storms.1 9 In 1955, Congress author-
ized the Secretary of the Army, in cooperation with the Secretary of
Commerce and other federal agencies, to survey hurricanes and
hurricane damage in the eastern and southern United States, and
to examine methods for minimizing the damage caused by erosion
and storms.20 One of the purposes of the survey was to determine
"possible means of preventing loss of human lives and damages to
property, with due consideration of the economics of proposed
breakwaters, seawalls, dikes, dams, and other structures, warning
services, or other measures which might be required. 21 The find-
ings of this survey were eventually documented in a final report to
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Public Affairs, Room 2108, 26
Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
15 A GUIDE TO SERVICES, supra note 11, at 9.
16 A GUIDE TO SERVICES, supra note 11, at 9.
17 COMMAND BRIEFING, supra note 8, at 2.
18 N.Y. DISTRICT, U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS, GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM
No. 1, MORICHES TO SHINNECOCK REACH (1963 & Supp. 1969, 1980) [hereinafter GEN-
ERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM No. 1] (documents may be obtained through the Free-
dom of Information Act ("FOIA"), 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966), by request in writing from
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26
Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
19 See, e.g., Laura Durkin, Cohalan Sees Storm Threat to Shellfish, NEWSDAY (Long Is-
land), Apr. 24, 1984, at 19; Susan Gilbert, America Washing Away, SCIENCE DIGEST, Aug.
1986, at 28; Sarah Lyall, Man vs. Nature in LI. Beach Restoration, N.Y. TIMES, May 10,
1991, at B1;John Rather, Beach Homes Imperiled Anew, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1984, § 21, at
1; John Rather, How Much More Erosion Can Beaches Take, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1993,
§ 13, at 1; Steve Wick & Sidney C. Schaer, A Way of Life Washed Away, Long Island
Community Being Swallowed by Ocean, NEWSDAY (New York), Mar. 21, 1993, at 50; Steve
Wick & Sidney C. Schaer, All Fall Down, The Disappearance of Dune Road, NEWSDAY
(Long Island), Mar. 21, 1993, at 4.
20 Coastal and Tidal Areas-Survey-Damages, Pub. L. No. 84-71, 1955
U.S.C.C.A.N. (69 Stat. 132) 152.
21 Id.
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Congress (the "Final Report").22 The section of the study concern-
ing the Atlantic coast of Long Island from Fire Island Inlet to Mon-
tauk Point appeared as House Document No. 425.23 The Final
Report concluded that one of the primary ill-effects of hurricanes
and storms was the erosion of beaches and dunes along the
shoreline.24
In the Final Report, the Corps proposed an ambitious project
to reshape eighty-three miles of coastline, or approximately seventy
percent of Long Island's total ocean frontage. 25 The plan provided
for beach and dune fill, including periodic nourishment to main-
tain shore stability, "grass planting on the dunes, relocation or rais-
ing of existing buildings which are located in the dune area, [and]
interior drainage structures .... ",26 The Corps also recognized that
construction of a series of protective jetties along the beach, tech-
nically known as "groins," could interrupt the flow of sand along
22 CHIEF OF ENGINEERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, SOUTH SHORE OF LONG ISLAND
FROM FIRE ISLAND INLET TO MONTAUK POINT, NEW YORK, BEACH EROSION CONTROL
STUDY AND HURRICANE SURVEY, H.R. Doc. No. 86-425 (1960).
23 At that time, the U.S. Army Chief of Engineers reported to the Secretary of the
Army that:
12. The shores of the area are exposed to waves of the Atlantic Ocean.
For winds from the east and southeast the fetch is unlimited, but for
those from the west and southwest the fetch is limited by the mainland
of NewJersey. Thus, the resulting energy components produce a domi-
nant westward littoral transport of beach material. Reversals in direc-
tion of transport of materials is greater in the eastern part of the area
than in the western part, resulting in less net transport in the eastern
part. Intermittent surveys of the shore and offshore depths since 1834
indicate alternate erosion and accretion with a net accumulating loss of
beaches. Since 1940[,] the net loss westward of Mecox Bay is estimated
at about 300,000 cubic yards annually, resulting in recession of the
beaches in certain areas ranging from a maximum of 500 feet... to 70
feet .... The value of land lost by erosion is estimated at $593,000
annually.
13. Hurricane losses in the area result chiefly from hurricane tides,
action of storm waves, inundation caused by hurricane-induced rain,
and wind action. Records indicate that since 1635 the area was affected
by 126 storms, of which 9 were unusually severe; 17, severe; 41, moder-
ate; and 59, threats only. A recurrence of the maximum hurricane tide
of record, that of September 1938 when 45 lives were lost, under 1958
conditions would cause inundation and wave damages in the area esti-
mated at $52,600,000. The average annual ocean tidal damages in the
area are estimated at $3,667,000, including $338,000 on the mainland
along the inner bays.
Id. 12-13, at 4-5.
24 Id. 148, at 76.
25 Id. 3, at 1.
26 Id. 123, at 61.
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the shoreline and inhibit ongoing erosion.27
Groins are solid structures, sometimes made out of stone,
which are constructed perpendicular to the shoreline in groups to
prevent storm damage, but especially to reduce and even replace
sand loss from coastal erosion. 28 The function of groins is to trap
sand deposited by the littoral drift29 on their updrift side (i.e., on
the side facing the current), and replace sand lost due to erosion. 0
However, groins may also cause downdrift beach starvation. 1
Since groins extend out perpendicular from the shoreline up to
500 yards in some cases, the stretch of beach on the downdrift side
(i.e., the side facing away from the flow of the littoral drift) be-
comes vulnerable to erosion by the current.12 Some studies indi-
cate that erosion in these areas is actually increased-until a point
further downdrift when the next groin begins to trap sand.33 At
least one of these studies indicates that, when erosion becomes se-
vere enough, construction of a subsequent groin is necessary to
protect the affected downdrift side. 4 This causes further erosion,
requiring construction of yet another groin.3 5 Conceivably, con-
struction of an initial groin might lead to an entire coastline pro-
27 Id. 14, at 5, 5, at 18, 12, at 21, 102(d), at 54, 77 113-14, at 58-59, 130, at
63, 148, at 76, 151, at 77.
28 1 COASTAL ENGINEERING RESEARCH CTR., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, SHORE PROTECTION
MANUAL 5-35 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1]; 2
COASTAL ENGINEERING RESEARCH CTR., DEP'T OF THE ARMY, SHORE PROTECTION MAN-
UAL 6-76 (4th ed. 1984) [hereinafter SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 2] (documents
may be obtained by FOIA request in writing from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
29 "The beach and nearshore zone of a coast is the region where the forces of the
sea react against the land. The physical system within this region is composed primar-
ily of the motion of the sea, which supplies energy to the system, and the shore, which
absorbs this energy." SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra note 28, at 1-4. A
"dynamic feature of the beach and nearshore physical system is littoral transport, de-
fined as the movement of sediments in the nearshore zone by waves and currents....
The material that is transported is called littoral drift." SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL
VOL. 1, supra note 28, at 1-13.
30 Dolan & Lins, supra note 1, at 73, 76; Omar J. Lillevang, Groins and Effects -
Minimizing Liabilities, in COASTAL ENGINEERING, SANTA BARBARA SPECIALTY CONFERENCE
749, 749 (AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, 1965). The General Design Memorandum No. 1 for
the project stated, "[t] he function of the groin is to provide, to build and to widen the
protective beach by trapping littoral drift, or to retard the loss of sand fill with mini-
mum interference with littoral movement." GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM No. 1,
supra note 18, at 23.
31 See Douglas L. Inman & Birchard M. Brush, The Coastal Challenge, SCIENCE,July 6,
1973, at 20, 29; see also Lillevang, supra note 30, at 749.
32 SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra note 28, at 5-35, 5-43.
33 See, e.g., Inman & Brush, supra note 31, at 29; Lillevang, supra note 30, at 750.
34 See Inman & Brush, supra note 31, at 29.
35 See Inman & Brush, supra note 31, at 29.
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tected by groins. 3 ' To combat this problem, sand fill is often
pumped onto the shore, into the "compartments" between the
groins.
The precise construction method to be employed, and the
number of groins to be erected, is left within the discretion of the
Corps, based upon experience and need. 38 The Corps recognizes,
however, that if groins are to be employed, one of two alternative
methods of construction may be necessary.39 The littoral drift on
the south shore of Long Island flows from east to west. If groins
were constructed without beach fill between the groin compart-
ments, construction should begin at the west end of a particular
parcel and proceed in an easterly direction.4 ° This method would
not cause erosion west of the last groin if there were no beach at
that point. If construction begins at the east end of a parcel, sand
fill should be placed in the groin compartments as they are con-
structed.41 This would prevent erosion since the groin would trap
very little sand as it flowed from east to west because the area be-
tween the groins would already be filled.
Congress approved the beach erosion and hurricane protec-
tion project recommended for Long Island's south shore in the
Rivers and Harbors Act of 1960.42 The Rivers and Harbors Act of
19604" and the Final Report44 required New York State and Suffolk
County to agree to certain conditions of.local cooperation as a pre-
requisite for federal participation in the project. Specifically, New
36 One study suggests:
The real "need" for a second or third structure may have been only
temporary .... However, if additional structures are built, the down-
coast erosion becomes more severe with each succeeding structure, un-
til finally a "point of no return" is reached where the need for addi-
tional protection from erosion becomes so urgent that the only choices
are: (i) to continue to build protective works, (ii) to find a new source
of beach sand, or (iii) possibly a combination of both.
Inman & Brush, supra note 31, at 29.
37 SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra note 28, at 543.
38 H.R. Doc. No. 86-425, 130, at 63, 1 151, at 77 (1960). No precise recommen-
dations were set forth in the Final Report relating to construction of, or number of,
groins, although the report recognized that " [s] ome limited groin construction might
be found warranted initially in the most vulnerable locations." Id. 114, at 59.
39 Id. 122, at 61.
40 Id.; SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra note 28, at 106-08.
41 H.R. Doc. No. 86-425, 122, at 61; SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra
note 28, at 106-08.
42 Land Acquisition Policy Act of 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-645, § 101, 74 Stat. 480, 546-
50 (1960).
43 Id. at 551.
44 H.R. Doc. No. 86-425, 18, at 7.
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York State was to submit specific assurances of local cooperation,
and was obligated to provide funding.45 Suffolk County was to con-
tribute a portion of the funding required for the project, obtain
easements from landowners, and maintain the project after com-
pletion (i.e., pump sand fill into the groin compartments). 46
The project authorized up to fifty groins, apportioned be-
tween three sections ("reaches"); thirteen groins were to be located
in the reach between Fire Island Inlet and Moriches Inlet, twenty-
three on the Westhampton Barrier Beach, and fourteen in the
Southampton to Beachampton Reach.4 7 In 1963, New York State
and the Corps executed an Assurance of Local Cooperation (the
"Assurance") for the Westhampton Barrier Beach portion of the
project.48 This Assurance provided for the construction of thirteen
groins starting at the east end of the barrier beach with extensive
sand fill in the compartments.49 New York State agreed to main-
tain all the works, to undertake periodic beach nourishment, and
to adopt laws to preserve and restore beaches and dunes.5" How-
ever, Suffolk County's Board of Supervisors refused to participate
in the project as defined by the Assurance, objecting to the place-
ment of sand fill in the compartments. 51 Suffolk County approved
a limited project which included construction of eleven groins, be-
ginning at the east end of the barrier beach, without the placement
45 § 101, 74 Stat. at 551, 553-54.
46 Id. at 553-54.
47 GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM No. 1, supra note 18, app. A.
48 The specific terms of participation were set forth in an Assurance of Local Co-
operation, signed by the State Superintendent of Public Works on August 14, 1963.
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Assurance of Local Cooperation (1963) (amended
1964, 1968) [hereinafter Assurance of Local Cooperation] (document may be ob-
tained by FOIA request in writing from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. Dis-
trict, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
49 Letter from Col. M.M. Miletich, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, toJ. Burch McMorran, Superintendent, New York State Department of Public
Works, advising of the inclusion of thirteen groins in the initial project construction
(Aug. 1, 1963) (document may be obtained by FOIA request in writing from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal
Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
50 Assurance of Local Cooperation, supra note 48, at 2-3.
51 See Beach Erosion Vote Delayed by Suffolk in Fiscal Dispute, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1963,
at 33; Ronald Maiorana, Suffolk Hedges on Erosion Work: Board Approves Army Plan for
Beach Control, but Imposes Conditions, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 13, 1963, at 33. Suffolk County's
concerns were summarized in Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1985). "[S]ince
[Suffolk] County was to be responsible for maintenance of the groins, it would have
the [financial] burden of maintaining any sand fill which was added; and [Suffolk]
County showed preference for the wealthier and more politically influential home-
owners in the East end." Id. at 286 n.5.
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of sand fill.52
Work on the project began in 1965 with construction of two
groins at Georgica Pond in East Hampton.53 No fill was added to
this groin compartment. Between January 1965 and October 1966,
eleven groins were installed on the Westhampton Barrier Beach,
beginning on the east end. Historically, this section is most vulner-
able to storms. 54 Clearly, at the time of design, the Corps contem-
plated that these groin compartments would be filled.55 However,
the compartments between these groins were not filled at the insis-
tence of local interests.5 a Since natural filling did not occur,
storms damaged the area immediately west of the eleven groins.57
Due to this subsequent depletion of sand from the western beach,
the Corps wrote to New York State urging that "dune and beach fill
[was] critically required" between the groins." New York State re-
52 Suffolk County, N.Y., Resolution No. 74-64, Relating to Erosion on the Atlantic
Shore Front in Suffolk County and the Construction of Groins (Feb. 3, 1964).
53 GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM No. 1, supra note 18, app. A.
54 Id. at app. D9
55 The General Design Memorandum No. 1 for this project states:
Because the shore is being reinforced with sand fill immediately after
the construction of groins, the groins will serve to retard the loss of
sand. Because the shore in which the groins will be placed is subject to
severe erosion and storm breakthrough[ ] of the narrow barrier beach,
the groins will serve to protect the width of the reinforced beach by
retarding loss of sand, and interrupt the lateral currents that are caused
by the breaks through the off-shore-bar and that cause heavy cut back of
the shore.
Id.
56 See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.
57 See Letter from Col. R.T. Batson, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers, to Division Engineer, North Atlantic Division, reporting the results of an in-
spection of the groin field to determine whether the dune and beach fill phase of the
work should be initiated in accordance with the agreement between New York State
and the federal government that artificial fill would be added when and to the extent
found necessary by the Chief of Engineers (May 8, 1967) (document may be obtained
by FOIA request in writing from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District,
Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278); Letter from
Col. R.T. Batson, District Engineer, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, to Division Engi-
neer, North Atlantic Division, reporting the results of a field reconnaissance made of
Fire Island and the area east of Moriches Inlet to determine existing beach conditions
(Feb. 20, 1967) (document may be obtained by FOIA request in writing from the U.S.
Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal
Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
58 Letter from Brig. Gen. H.G. Woodbury, Jr., Director of Civil Works, United
States Department of the Army, to J. Burch McMorran, Superintendent, New York
State Department of Public Works, reporting that groins alone would not provide the
beach erosion control and hurricane protection authorized, and that dune and beach
fill was critically required (June 1, 1967) (document may be obtained by FOIA request
in writing from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Counsel,
Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
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plied requesting the placement of beach fill in the existing groin
field, and the construction of four additional groins with dune and
beach fill on Westhampton Beach. 59 Once again, Suffolk County
objected to the placement of fill. Between August 1969 and No-
vember 1970, however, four additional groins were built to the
west, and the four westernmost compartments were filled, to allevi-
ate damage. 60 Due to funding limitations, Suffolk County could
not support the subsequent artificial filling of the compartments
between the first eleven groins.6 Additionally, Suffolk County
would not support a proposal by the Corps to undertake further
groin construction.6 2 To date, no further construction of groins
on the beach has taken place.63
III. THE PROBLEM
As a result of these and similar projects, landowners have
brought suit for erosion allegedly caused by inadequate construc-
tion and/or maintenance of projects.6 4 Since the New York Dis-
59 Letter from J. Burch McMorran, Superintendent, New York State Department
of Public Works, to Brig. Gen. H.G. Woodbury, Jr., Director of Civil Works, United
States Department of the Army, requesting construction of four additional groins and
the placement of dune and beach fill in all groin compartments (June 16, 1967) (doc-
ument may be obtained by FOIA request in writing from the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York,
N.Y. 10278).
60 The westernmost portion of the 15 groins is located 3.2 miles east of Moriches
Inlet. See GENERAL DESIGN MEMORANDUM No. 1, supra note 18, app. A, D.
61 See David A. Andelman, U.S. Plan on Beaches Disputed, N.Y. TIMES (BQLI), Apr. 1,
1973, at 87; Demma, supra note 2, at 3; Freedman & Meyers, supra note 2, at 1; Fresco,
supra note 2, at 7; Ed Lowe, Gilgo Beach Washed Out by Storm, NEWSDAY (Long Island),
Mar. 27, 1973, at 5; Donna Petrozzello, Dispute Snags Funds to Plug Inlet, HAMPTON
CHRON., Mar. 11, 1993, at 1; John Rather, Plan Gains to Monitor and Predict Changes in
Beach Erosion, N.Y. TIMES (L.I.),July 5, 1992, at 7; Snider, supra note 2, at 7; Spencer &
Scovel, supra note 2, at 3; Bob Wacker, et. al., A Barrier Beach Is Breached... and Now Its
Doom Is Predicted, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Apr. 4, 1973, at 3.
62 See newspaper articles cited supra note 61.
63 However, the New York District has begun pumping beach fill into the compart-
ments between the first eleven groins as part of a settlement agreement stemming
from recent litigation concerning the construction. See Erosion Suit Settled, THE EAST-
HAMPTON STAR, Mar. 27, 1986, at 1.
64 See, e.g., Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. C1. 554 (1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1994) (suit by 217 owners of beachfront property near Port Canaveral and
Sebastian Inlet in Brevard County, Florida, seeking recovery of compensation for ero-
sion and flood damage to their properties allegedly caused by the Corps in construct-
ing and maintaining the Canaveral Harbor Project, designed to provide a deepwater
harbor on the east coast of Florida); Pitman v. United States, 457 F.2d 975 (Ct. Cl.
1972) (suit to recover just compensation for an alleged taking of beachfront property
in Brevard County, Florida. Plaintiff alleged he had sustained harm to his property as
a result of construction and operation of the Canaveral Harbor Project. The essence
of plaintiffs claim was that the project had interrupted southerly littoral drift and
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trict first commenced work on Long Island's south shore, several
suits have been filed in the Second Circuit against the United
States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (the "FTCA"), and
requesting a total of nearly $300 million in damages." Generally,
these plaintiffs sued the federal government alleging that their
properties, located to the west of the groins, suffered catastrophic
damage."6 They further alleged that this damage occurred as a re-
sult of improper design, construction, and maintenance of the
groins presently in place and the failure to complete the beach
erosion and hurricane protection project in this area.67 These
plaintiffs asserted that erosion along Long Island's south shore was
minimal prior to the beginning of groin construction. 8 However,
the area to the west of the groins eroded much faster after con-
struction was completed.69 In addition, most of the sand was
thereby caused the loss of about four acres of his property.); Miramar Co. v. Santa
Barbara, 143 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1943) (owner of a large resort hotel sued seeking compensa-
tion because the hotel's beach property had been reduced in size by erosion allegedly
caused by the Santa Barbara Breakwater); Katenkamp v. Union Realty Co., 59 P.2d
473 (Cal. 1936) (owners of oceanfront land east of the defendant's two groins
brought a series of suits seeking an injunction to remove them for allegedly causing
erosion of the plaintiffs' property).
65 In 1973, Thomas O'Grady and Dorothy Patton brought suit against the United
States and Suffolk County in the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of New York. Complaint, O'Grady v. United States, No. 73 Civ. 1182 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Nov. 2, 1973). O'Grady was brought on behalf of all property owners living immedi-
ately west (i.e., on the downdrift side) of the 15th groin, and alleged that the partially
completed groin field caused rapid erosion of the plaintiffs' property. Id.
O'Grady was superseded in 1984 when a complaint was filed by individual home-
owners on the west end of the Westhampton Barrier Beach. Complaint, Rapf v. Suf-
folk, No. CV-84-1478 (E.D.N.Y. filed Apr. 11, 1984). The plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief against Suffolk County, alleging that the County "constructed or caused to be
constructed" groins along the barrier beach, and that the County's failure to maintain
the groins constituted a continuing nuisance that threatened to destroy their homes
and those of their neighbors. Id.
While the Rapf suit was pending, Michael Kennedy, a prominent Manhattan at-
torney, brought an action against the United States alleging that construction and
supervision of the groins at Georgica Pond was performed negligently, blocking the
normal replenishment of sand on his property and causing a constant and swift loss of
beachfront. Complaint, Kennedy v. United States, No. CV-85-0581 (E.D.N.Y. filed
Feb. 25, 1985).
66 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Kennedy v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D.N.Y.
1986) (No. CV-85-0581); Complaint at 7, Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1985)
(CV-84-1478). An alarming photograph of a 1992 breach of the barrier island at
Westhampton Beach, just west of the 15th groin, which led to catastrophic damage, is
reprinted on the cover of U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, NEW YoRK DIsTRiCT TIMES,
May, 1996, at 1.
67 See, e.g., Complaint at 3, Kennedy (No. CV-85-0581); Complaint at 7, Rapf(CV-84-
1478).
68 See, e.g., Complaint at 7, Rapf (CV-84-1478).
69 Id.
40 NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2:29
trapped by the groins in the first few years after their construction
was completed, causing a majority of the erosion to plaintiffs'
properties over the last four decades.7"
One of the government's preliminary procedural defenses was
an assertion that these suits were time barred by the FTCA's two-
year statute of limitations.7' However, the Second Circuit consist-
ently rejected the government's argument, holding that the plain-
tiffs stated a claim "for a continuing tort for which the cause of
action accrues anew each day."72 Thus, it is possible that numerous
other plaintiffs could bring suit against the United States, since the
practical effect of this ruling creates a new cause of action every
day. It is conceivable that the government will continue to assert
the statute of limitations defense in its answers, and argue that the
Second Circuit erred in its decision. To date, the United States
Supreme Court has not ruled on the issue of whether construction
of shore restoration projects may constitute continuing torts under
the FFCA, thereby exposing the government to liability years after
projects are completed.7"
IV. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAiMs ACT AND ITS STATUTE
OF LIMITATIONS
The FITCA and its provisions7" represent a limited waiver of
the United States' sovereign immunity from liability arising out of
the tortious conduct of its employees. 75 As such, the FTCA is a
70 Id.
71 See, e.g., Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282, 288 (2d Cir. 1985); Kennedy v. United
States, 643 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
72 Rapf 755 F.2d at 292.
73 The Supreme Court did, however, address this issue with regard to a claim for a
taking under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1346(a), 1402(a), 1491, 1496, 1497,
1501, 1503, 2071, 2072, 2411, 2501, 2512 (1993). See United States v. Dickinson, 331
U.S. 745 (1947).
74 The provisions of the FTCA, originally enacted as the Legislative Reorganization
Act of 1946, are now scattered throughout various sections of the United States Code.
Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346(b), (c), 1402(b), 1504, 2110, 2401(b), 2402,
2411(b), 2412(c), 2671-2680 (1993)).
75 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS: ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDI-
CIAL REMEDIES § 1.03, at 1-13 (1997).
An immunity is a freedom from suit or liability .... The traditional
governmental immunity protects governments at all levels from legal
actions. At the level of the state and national governments, this immu-
nity is usually referred to as sovereign immunity .... Though the no-
tion of sovereign immunity might seem best suited to a government of
royal power, the doctrine was nevertheless accepted by American judges
in the early days of the republic, and the law of the United States has
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critical remedial provision because it allows citizens to bring suit
against the federal government for its tortious conduct. Indeed, it
constitutes the most comprehensive remedy in terms of coverage.7"
The explicit language of the FTCA assures that it was designed to
address any tort actionable under state law in the jurisdiction
where the conduct occurs.77 Most scenarios, such as an automobile
accident, leave no doubt that a tort has been committed.78 There
is no conceptual difficulty as to when this tort was committed and
by whom, and whether there was resultant damage. However,
some scenarios comprise more complex, attenuated, and un-
perceived conduct. Such cases may include medical malpractice,
toxic tort, and environmental tort claims. Particularly in these situ-
ations, the accrual dates are difficult to determine. The operation
of the statute's two-year limitations period is therefore problematic.
Such is the case when the tort appears to be ongoing, for which the
plaintiff defers bringing suit. The availability of an FTCA remedy,
then, often turns on the operation of the statute's limitations
period.
In the original Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, the stat-
ute of limitations period was established at one year.79 In 1949, this
Act was amended, increasing the limitations period to two years.80
The provisions were modified again in 1966, requiring the filing of
ever since been that, except to the extent the government consents to
suit, it is immune.... [The FTCA] gave a general consent of the gov-
ernment to be sued in tort ....
W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 131, at 1032-34
(5th ed. 1984).
76 JAYSON, supra note 75.
77 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) provides that "district courts... shall have exclusive juris-
diction of civil actions [in all cases] under circumstances where the United States, if a
private person, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place
where the act or omission occurred."
78 See S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2519 (1966).
79 § 420, 60 Stat. 812, at 845.
80 Federal Tort Claims Act-Time for Bringing Suit, Pub. L. No. 81-55, 1949
U.S.C.C.S. (62 Stat. 971) 62, 66 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994)).
The committee feel[s] that, in comparison to analogous [s]tate and
[flederal statutes of limitation, the existing [one]-year period is too
short and tends toward injustice in many instances. For example, an
analysis of the statutes of limitation of the 48 [s] tates and the District of
Columbia reveals that the average limitation provided for personal in-
jury cases is 2.96 years, for property damage cases it is 3.90 years, and for
cases of death by wrongful act it is 1.90 years. The over[ ]all combined
average is the one to which the Tort Claims Act limitation should be
compared, since the Tort Claims Act covers all three types of torts
under one inclusive period of limitation.
H.R. REP. No. 81-276, at 1227 (1949).
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an administrative claim, and the claim's denial by a federal agency,
as a prerequisite to bring suit."1 The modifications regarding
claims accruing on or after January 18, 1967 appear in the FTCA's
current statute of limitations, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2401 (b) .82
The language of the FTCA limitations period has generated
many questions. Particularly critical for our purpose is this ques-
tion: At what point does an FICA cause of action accrue and the
statutory period begin to run? The answer is inherently difficult to
determine.
It is clear from the language of the statute that state law deter-
mines whether the defendant's action gives rise to a cause of action
at all. Actions may be maintained against the government "under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would
be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of the [state]
where the .. . [negligence] occurred." 3 Stated another way, state
law controls the question of whether a cause of action accrues. How-
ever, issues arose early in the judicial interpretation of § 2401 (b)
over whether state or federal law controls the determination of
when a claim accrues under the FTCA. The legislative history of
§ 2401 (b) does not aid in resolving this point. No language in the
reports specifically refers to what is meant by the term "accrues."8 4
Statements in the reports address the length of the period in which
to bring a claim once that claim is actionable. 5
Before 1980, some courts held that state law controlled when a
claim accrued.86 However, subsequent courts have concluded that
81 Tort Claims-Agency Consideration, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 7, 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N.
(80 Stat. 306) 346, 348.
82 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) provides:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is
presented in writing to the appropriate [flederal agency within two
years after such claim accrues or unless action is begun within six
months after the date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of no-
tice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was presented.
28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
Also important is a provision in 28 U.S.C. § 2675 which states: "The failure of an
agency to make final disposition of a claim within six months after it is filed shall, at
the option of the claimant any time thereafter, be deemed a final denial of the claim
for purposes of this section." 28 U.S.C. § 2675 (1994).
83 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1994).
84 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 81-276 (1949). The 1966 Amendment made the time of
filing the administrative claim the critical date for limitations purposes, but although
the reports indicate this change in detail, they do not further explain when a claim
"accrues" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b). S. REP. No. 89-1327 (1966).
85 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-1327, at 2518; H.R. REP. No. 81-276, at 1227.
86 For example, until the 1980s, the First Circuit held that state law governed when
a claim accrues for purposes of the FFCA. See, e.g., Hau v. United States, 575 F.2d
[Vol. 2:29
1998] BEACH EROSION AND HURRICANE PROTECTION 43
federal law controls this determination. s7 There was great debate
on this question in the early 1960s.88 Now federal law is uniformly
held to control when a claim accrues under the two-year statute
applying to tort claims against the United States. 9 Courts have
held that the FTCA prescribes its own limitations. Where the time
allowed for an action against a private party under local law is less
than that prescribed in the FTCA, the more generous time pre-
scribed in the FCA is allowed for suit against the United States.90
At the same time, where local law allows a more generous time
than that set forth in the FTCA, the time prescribed in the FTCA
controls.9" The rationale for these rules is stated in Quinton v.
1000, 1002 (1st Cir. 1978); see also Caron v. United States, 548 F.2d 366, 367-68 (1st
Cir. 1976); Tessier v. United States, 269 F.2d 305, 309 (1st Cir. 1959). Although the
First Circuit has not expressly reversed itself on this issue, in more recent cases it has
referred exclusively to federal law for the definition of accrual. See Nicolazzo v.
United States, 786 F.2d 454, 455 (1st Cir. 1986). Lower courts within the First Circuit
have interpreted Nicolazzo as holding that federal law controls. See Attallah v. United
States, 758 F. Supp. 81, 83 (D.P.R. 1991); Santana v. United States, 693 F. Supp. 1309,
1312 n.2 (D.P.R. 1988).
87 See, e.g., Slaaten v. United States, 990 F.2d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 1993); Gould v.
United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1025 (1991); Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268 (7th Cir.
1980); Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278, 1283-84 (5th Cir. 1980); Tyminski v.
United States, 481 F.2d 257, 262-63 (3d Cir. 1973).
88 See Recent Developments, Federal Law Held to Govern Accrual of Cause of Action
Under Federal Tort Claims Act, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 536 (1963).
[B]ecause suits under the [FTCA] possess elements of diversity actions
although they are brought under a federal statute that contains a limita-
tion on the time of suit, the problem is presented of determining which
law governs the commencement of the litigation. This question has pre-
viously been decided by two district courts and two courts of appeals.
Both district courts held that federal law governs as to the time at which
the statute of limitations begins to run. The courts of appeals have di-
vided, the First Circuit holding that state law governs, and the Fifth Cir-
cuit holding to the contrary.
Id. at 538-39 (citations omitted).
89 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111 (1979). The Supreme Court did not
expressly address the issue, but the accrual rule that emerged was in large part based
on the Court's opinion in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 168-71 (1949), where the
Court held that federal law controls. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120 n.7. The Court analyzed
congressional intent, and did not refer to or address state law in any way. Id. at 119-
21. As such, the Court implied that federal law controls.
90 See, e.g., Young v. United States, 184 F.2d 587, 589 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (FTCA's two-
year period, rather than the District of Columbia's one-year period, applied to a claim
for "death occasioned by negligence"); Maryland ex rel. Burkhardt v. United States,
165 F.2d 869, 875 (4th Cir. 1947) (FTCA's two-year period applied rather than Mary-
land's one-year period for wrongful death claims).
91 See, e.g., Magruder v. Smithsonian Inst., 758 F.2d 591, 593-94 (11th Cir. 1985)
(FTCA's two-year period, rather than Florida's four-year period, applied to a claim for
alleged conversion by the Smithsonian Institute); Wollman v. Gross, 637 F.2d 544,
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United States.92
Obviously, if the various states' rules could severally determine
when a claim accrued against the [g] overnment under [s] ection
2401 (b), the uniformity which Congress sought by enacting that
section would be, for all practical purposes, a goal impossible of
attainment. Differing state rules as to when a particular tort
claim accrues would necessarily produce diverse decisions as to
the effect of [s]ection 2401(b).93
As such, federal courts have been free to develop their own
law with respect to when a claim accrues under § 2401 (b).
V. THE FTCA's STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IN SECOND CIRCUIT
NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS FOR EROSION
In its most recent decision concerning a negligence claim
under the FICA for coastal erosion, the Second Circuit held, in
Rapf v. Suffolk,9 4 that the statute of limitations was tolled because
the government's actions amounted to a continuing tort. This de-
cision and the United States District Court's decision from the
Eastern District of New York in Kennedy v. United StateP5 were not
favorable to the government. In Rapf individual homeowners of
oceanfront property west of the fifteenth groin brought an action
seeking injunctive relief against Suffolk County. They alleged that
the County "constructed or caused to be constructed" the groins
on the Westhampton Barrier Beach, and failed to maintain them,
constituting a continuous nuisance that threatened to destroy their
homes.9 6 The Second Circuit explicitly rejected Suffolk County's
position that the suit was time barred by the statute of limitations.
The court held that the plaintiffs stated a claim for a continuing
tort (i.e., where there is a series of continuing harms to the plain-
tiff) "for which the cause of action accrues anew each day."9 7 How-
ever, the Rapf court decided an issue solely on New York law
because, at the time, Suffolk County was the only defendant. Rapf
held, in essence, that inaction may constitute a continuing tort.9"
549-50 (8th Cir. 1980) (FTCA's limitations period rather than South Dakota's three-
year period applied to a negligence claim).
92 304 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1962).
93 Id. at 236.
94 755 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1985).
95 643 F. Supp. 1072 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
96 Rapf 755 F.2d at 284.
97 Id. at 290.
98 The Rapf holding is explicitly based on three New York cases. See Kearney v.
Atlantic Cement Co., 306 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 1969); Amax, Inc. v. Sohio Indus.
Prods. Co., 469 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1983); State v. Schenectady Chems., Inc., 459
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In Kennedy, where the United States was the defendant, prop-
erty owners alleged that government construction and supervision
of the two stone groins at Georgica Pond were performed negli-
gently and in reckless disregard of the duty of care owed to prop-
erty owners. 99  Furthermore, they alleged that the action
constituted a continuing nuisance and a continuing trespass.
100
Citing Rapf the court held that the Kennedy's made out a claim for
a continuing tort "for which the cause of action accrues anew each
day."101 Therefore, the statute of limitations for tort claims against
the United States did not bar the action.
10 2
N.Y.S.2d 971 (Sup. Ct. 1983, modified, 479 N.Y.S.2d 1010 (App. Div. 1984)). Each of
these cases involved the allegedly tortious contamination of land from a single act,
followed by the failure to remove the contamination. Kearney, 306 N.Y.S.2d at 46;
Amax, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 283-84; Schenectady, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 974. At the time the suits
were filed, the contamination had continued for many years. Kearney, 306 N.Y.S.2d at
46 (six years); Amax, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 284 (approximately twenty years); Schenectady,
459 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (approximately thirty years). Under New York law, as derived
from these cases, the failure to repair the original condition may constitute a continu-
ing tort even when the last active transgression occurred many years before. Kearney,
306 N.Y.S.2d at 46-47; Amax, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 284-85; Schenectady, 459 N.Y.S.2d at 977-
78.
99 Kennedy v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1072, 1075 (E.D.N.Y. 1986). For a pro-
file of the plaintiffs in this case, see Michael Gross, Ivana's Avenger, N.Y. MAG., Feb. 18,
1991, at 33.
100 Kennedy, 643 F. Supp. at 1075.
101 Id. at 1079 (citing Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282, 292 (2d Cir. 1985)).
102 Judge Wexler ultimately ruled in favor of the United States in Kennedy, finding
that no causation was established between construction of the groins and the eroded
property. In deciding the statute of limitations issue, Judge Wexler concluded that
the construction constituted a continuing tort. Id. (citing Rapf 755 F.2d at 292).
However, in his decision following trial on the merits, Judge Wexler stated that the
United States' "alleged negligence ceased" in 1972. Findings of Fact and Conclusions
of Law at 5, Kennedy (No. CV-85-0581). These statements are inconsistent. If the gov-
ernment's acts or omissions constituted a continuing tort for which a cause of action
accrues anew each day, how can it be that the United States' negligence suddenly
ceased in 1972, some seven years after the groins were constructed in 1964-1965?
In his decision on the merits, Judge Wexler found several facts:
The solution to this [downdrift] beach starvation is to introduce
new sand into the [groin] system or otherwise build up the starved areas
downdrift of the groin fields. In theory, once the groin compartments
are filled, the sand can resume its unrestricted movement downdrift
but, until the groins have been filled either through artificially filling
them or naturally being filled by the downward drift, there is beach
erosion downdrift of the last groin....
The groins were substantially filled by trapping sand since 1972 and
the downdrift has been mitigated extensively.
The Corps failed to introduce new sand into the groin system after
1972.
Id. 4, at 3-4, 9, at 4, 1 10, at 4.
Judge Wexler concluded:
Here, plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of proof that the de-
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fendant's alleged negligence was the proximate cause of their injuries.
Plaintiffs have not established that the erosion damage resulting from
the downward drift of defendant's groins severely weakened the shore-
line, nor have they established that any damage resulting from defend-
ant's negligence prior to 1972, when starvation of the downward drift
ceased, has continued to the present.
Since plaintiffs purchased [the property] in 1976, four years after
defendant's alleged negligence ceased, plaintiffs cannot now establish that
the Corps of Engineers' construction of or failure to maintain the two
groins substantially caused the injuries complained of.
Id. 1 5, at 5, 1 6, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
Unfortunately, in this decision there is no application which might shed light on
the reasoning behind Judge Wexler's conclusions. This leaves a burning question:
Why did the United States' alleged negligence cease in 1972? The answer to this
question might have serious implications for the resolution of issues in future cases
since this conclusion leads to an ultimate finding of no causation. If adopted in fu-
ture decisions, Judge Wexler's reasoning might prove favorable to the government.
It is clear thatJudge Wexler ultimately found no causation between construction
and maintenance of the groins and erosion of the plaintiffs' property because the
United States' alleged negligence ceased in 1972, and the plaintiffs did not purchase
the property until 1976. However, regardless of when the plaintiffs purchased the
property, the fact still remains that the alleged negligence ceased.
There were several references to causation in briefs submitted by both sides. See
Defendants' Post-Trial Reply Memorandum of Law, Kennedy v. United States, No. CV-
85-0581 (E.D.N.Y. June 30, 1988) [hereinafter Defendants' Post-Trial Reply]; Plain-
tiffs' Reply Memorandum of Law, Kennedy v. United States, No. CV-85-0581 (E.D.N.Y.
June 29, 1988) [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Reply]; Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum of
Law, Kennedy v. United States, No. CV-85-0581 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 1988) [hereinafter
Defendants' Post-Trial Memorandum]; Plaintiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum of Law,
Kennedy v. United States, No. CV-85-0581 (E.D.N.Y. June 6, 1988) [hereinafter Plain-
tiffs' Post-Trial Memorandum]. Four main points continually recurred:
(1) In theory, once groin compartments become filled, either artificially or natu-
rally, the sand can resume its unrestricted movement downdrift. The time period
required for the entire system to naturally fill and the material to resume its un-
restricted movement downdrift may be so long that severe downdrift damage may
result. Nevertheless, the Georgica Pond groin compartments completely filled in
1972. The United States alleged that the normal downdrift patterns were re-estab-
lished, and the groins became a neutral factor in any later erosion at the plaintiffs'
home. See Defendants' Post-Trial Reply, at 5-6, 10; Plaintiffs' Reply, at 12; Plaintiffs'
Post-Trial Memorandum, at 7-10.
(2) See Inman & Brush, supra note 31; SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 1, supra
note 28; SHORE PROTECTION MANUAL VOL. 2, supra note 28. Expert opinion indicates
that even after the groins are filled, an area immediately downdrift of the groins may
continue to be adversely affected. Transport patterns of sand are never fully re-estab-
lished. There is a "shadow effect" downdrift of the groins; sediment that rounds the
tip of a groin and finds itself in deeper water is not going to be transported suddenly
shoreward. The transported offshore sand does not suddenly make a right angle turn
and return to shore. Thus, sediment leaves the beach at its normal rate due to wave
and tidal action, but the groins interfere with the deposit of sediment from upshore
that would otherwise compensate for that loss. Although the transport patterns may
re-establish themselves further down the beach, the area within the shadow of the
groins (1000-1500 feet according to the government expert and up to 3000 meters
according to the plaintiffs' expert) continues to be starved for sand even after the
groins are filled. The Kennedy property is located some 3300 feet from the nearest
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The Kennedy court's reliance on Rapf was erroneous. The Sec-
ond Circuit held, in Rapf that under New York law a continuous
tort may be the result of continuous inaction. However, when de-
termining when a cause of action accrues under the FTCA, federal
law applies. Under federal law, an alleged tortfeasor's inaction is
insufficient to support a finding of continuous tort 0 3 except in
federal groin. See Defendants' Post-Trial Reply, at 8-9; Plaintiffs' Reply, at 12, 15; De-
fendants' Post-Trial Memorandum, at 18.
(3) Erosion to the plaintiffs' property may have been caused by other factors.
These include the opening of the Georgica Pond "gut" just east of the plaintiffs'
home, see Defendants' Post-Trial Reply, at 9, and natural forces such as the rising sea
level, storms, and tides. See Defendants' Post-Trial Reply, at 21, 23, 26-27; Plaintiffs'
Reply, at 12-13.
(4) The trimline (i.e., the line of vegetation and grasses landward of dunes
which: (1) measures the stable protective border between the beach and the land;
and (2) anchors the sand, acting as a buffer against natural forces) in front of the
plaintiffs' property had not been affected since 1972. According to expert testimony,
movement of the trimline is a more reliable measure of erosion since a grass and
vegetation line is a stronger protective barrier than sand against the effects of wind
and water. See Defendants' Post-Trial Reply, at 5, 22-23.
Applying these principles to the Westhampton groin field:
(1) The Corps did not add any artificial fill to the compartments of the first
eleven groins in the field when they were constructed. These compartments are natu-
rally filling. The Corps did add artificial fill to the compartments of the last four
groins in the field during their construction, and they are also naturally filling. The
definition of "full" is difficult to articulate. It is not clear that any of the compart-
ments have reached their full capacity. In addition, the Corps recently began to add
fill to the compartments of the initial groins as part of an interim project. Therefore,
it is not likely that the normal downward littoral drift pattern (from east to west) has
been re-established.
(2) It is likely that the Westhampton groins have a "shadow effect" similar to the
Georgica Pond groins. This is a function of, among other things, the length of the
groins. The two groins at Georgica Pond are 475 feet long. The "shadow effect" is
1000-1500 feet according to the government expert or up to 3000 meters according
to the plaintiffs' expert. Similarly, the Westhampton groins are approximately 500
feet long. The length of their "shadow effect" might be significant depending on the
distance between the groins and the easternmost plaintiffs in future cases.
(3) Natural forces such as rising sea levels, storms, and tides may have caused
erosion to the plaintiffs' property. Severe storms in the spring of 1984 and in Decem-
ber 1986, and a "syzygy" storm (i.e., when the full moon and high tides coincide with
a severe northeastern storm) in January 1987, had a dramatic impact along much of
Long Island's south shore. Additionally, December 1992 storms seriously damaged
Dune Road, Westhampton Beach, New York, and the property of many of its resi-
dents. The damage was so bad that Judge Bartels issued a decision stating that a
settlement conference should be held. Memorandum-Decision at 1-2, Rapfv. Suffolk,
No. CV-84-1478 (E.D.N.Y. 1993).
103 For purposes of the limitations period, courts generally distinguish between
continuing acts and singular acts that bring continuing consequences. A continuing
ill effect arising from earlier misconduct does not constitute a continuing tort in and
of itself. See, e.g., Batiste v. Boston, 23 F.3d 394, 1994 WL 164568, at *2 (1st Cir. May 2,
1994) (unpublished); Aiello v. Browning Ferris, Inc., 1993 WL 463701, at *7 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 2, 1993); Chudzik v. Wilmington, 809 F. Supp. 1142 (D. Del. 1992).
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those distinguishable cases alleging continuous trespass resulting
from a mistaken deed.1"4 Continuing violations under federal law
require ongoing tortious conduct, or a chain of tortious activity. 10 5
This is significant since the Second Circuit held, in Kossick v. United
States," 6 that a rationale which might allow an action to toll the
statute of limitations under New York State law was not effective to
toll the statute under the FTCA.' 0 7
The federal government's position is made more tenuous by
the Federal Circuit's decision in Applegate v. United States1°8 because
that court's decision is consistent with the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Rapf Applegate is likely to be relied on by future plaintiffs,
even in the Second Circuit. In Applegate, 271 Florida beachfront
landowners claimed a taking of their properties by erosion caused
by the Corps' Canaveral Harbor Project.10 9 The United States
Court of Federal Claims granted the government's motion to dis-
miss for the plaintiffs' failure to file suit within the six-year statute
of limitations under the Tucker Act."0 "Plaintiffs could foresee,
beginning in 1966, if not earlier, that the [Canaveral Harbor] Pro-
ject would cause serious damage to their properties,""' but plain-
tiffs did not file suit until December, 1992.112 The Federal Circuit
reversed, relying on United States v. Dickinson.'a3 The Dickinson
104 See, e.g., Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546, 1559 (6th Cir. 1997).
105 See, e.g., Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818, 821 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Leonhard v.
United States, 633 F.2d 599, 613 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981);
Donaldson v. O'Conner, 493 F.2d 507, 529 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
422 U.S. 563 (1975). Even the existence of an ongoing relationship does not insure
that a cause of action will be deemed continuous for purposes of computing the stat-
ute of limitations period. See, e.g., Cooper v. United States, 442 F.2d 908 (7th Cir.
1971) (holding that inaction was not a continuing violation under the FTCA where
the government repeatedly refused to provide medical treatment to a plaintiff for
injuries received in jail).
106 330 F.2d 933 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837 (1964).
107 Id. at 934-36.
108 25 F.3d 1579 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
109 The Applegate plaintiffs claimed a Fifth Amendment taking, rather than negli-
gence under the FTCA. However, the court utilized applicable reasoning in conclud-
ing that the erosion amounted to a continuous taking. Indeed, a suit based on
identical facts as Rapfwas filed in the Court of Federal Claims alleging a Fifth Amend-
ment taking. Complaint, DeVito v. United States, No. 96-78L (Fed. Cl. Feb. 9, 1996).
Subsequently, the parties in that case stipulated to its dismissal. Stipulation and No-
tice of Dismissal Without Prejudice, DeVito v. United States, No. 96-69L (Fed. Cl. Oct.
3, 1996).
110 Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. C1. 554, 563-65 (1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 1579
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
111 Id. at 563.
112 Id. at 557.
113 331 U.S. 745 (1947).
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Court held that where the government "[leaves] the taking to phys-
ical events," '14 the claimant can postpone filing suit until the situa-
tion becomes "stabilized."115 The Federal Circuit Court found that
the Corps set in motion a very gradual and perpetual physical tak-
ing, and further complicated ascertaining the extent and nature of
the damage by proposing to install a sand transfer plant.1
16 Thus,
the taking situation had not been stabilized.
1 7 The court in Apple-
gate concluded that these landowners, who suffered an ongoing,
gradual, and physical taking, need not have risked premature liti-
gation. "Under the Dickinson rule, the statute of limitations did not
bar [the] suit in 1992."118
The Second Circuit should adopt the Court of Federal Claims'
reasoning in Applegate. This, of course, would be favorable to the
federal defendants, and in accord with the tenet that the FTCA's
statute of limitations "should be liberally construed in favor of re-
pose for the United States." '119 Certainty, definiteness, or foresee-
ability of flooding or erosion, and not the complete erosion of the
"last grain of sand," should define the taking and trigger the limita-
tions period.
120
Rapf Kennedy, and Applegate would be distinguishable from fu-
ture litigation concerning the Westhampton groin field. For exam-
ple, in Applegate, the Federal Circuit heavily relied on the Corps'
promises to repair the damage as evidence that the situation in that
case had not stabilized. 121 Here, the Corps has made no promises
to repair the damage by modifying permits, or removing the groin
field. The court in Rapf interpreted New York law where all parties
were New York litigants.1 22 In determining when a cause of action
arises under the FTCA, federal law applies.
123 Thus, federal law
would apply in any future suit concerning the Westhampton groin
field brought against the United States as defendant. Kennedy was
decided in favor of the government at the district court level, and
114 Id. at 748.
115 Id. at 749.
116 Applegate v. United States, 25 F.3d 1579, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
117 Id. at 1583-84.
118 Id. at 1584.
119 Cooper v. United States, 442 F.2d 908, 912 (7th Cir. 1971).
120 Applegate v. United States, 28 Fed. Cl. 554, 562 (1993), rev'd, 25 F.3d 1579 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
121 Applegate, 25 F.3d at 1582-84.
122 Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282, 284 (2d Cir. 1985). Subsequently, the United
States was impleaded as a third party defendant. However, the statute of limitations
issue was never revisited as it might have applied to this defendant.
123 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text.
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overlooked the proper interpretation of a "continuing violation"
under federal law.
1 24
VI. THE RELATED ISSUE OF DAMAGES
If the Second Circuit remains steadfast in its decision to label
the project a continuing tort, then the quantum of damages would
become a critical issue. The general rule in cases of continuing
torts is that the plaintiff is permitted to recover damages only for
harm up to the time of trial.125 To recover for harm caused by
future invasions (i.e., after the time of trial), the injured person
must bring successive actions for the invasions or series of inva-
sions. 126 Only when the invasion is "substantial and relatively en-
during in character and not readily alterable," can the injured
party request an injunction or elect to sue for future damages
"once and for all. ' 127 Thus, damages may be categorized as those
for past harms and those for future harms, with the time of trial
being the divider. Here, because ajurisdictional prerequisite exists
to sue under the FTCA, the filing of an administrative claim may be
considered the critical date for limitations purposes. 128
Federal law on damages for past invasions is much less clear.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 899 comment d suggests
the general rule is:
the statute [of limitations] does not run from the time of the first
harm except [as to] the harm then caused. Thus, for example, when
there has been the tortious emission of fumes from a factory,
the plaintiff is not required to treat the harm as a unit and is
entitled to recover.., damages for harm that has accrued within the
period provided by statute for that type of tort.' 29
This implies that when the first wave hit Long Island's south
shore after groin completion in 1960, the statute of limitations be-
gan to run as to the harm caused by that wave, and continued for two
years. At the end of that two year period, the opportunity to sue
for harm caused by that wave was lost. When the next wave hit the
124 See, e.g., cases cited supra note 105.
125 JAYSON, supra note 75, § 14.03[4] (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899
cmt. d (1977)).
126 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 cmt. a (1977). Federal law supports the
proposition that plaintiffs must sue in successive actions. See Reynolds Metals Co. v.
I.B. Wand, 308 F.2d 504, 508 (9th Cir. 1962).
127 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 930 cmt. b (1977). See id § 161 cmt. b (1963-
1964).
128 See Tort Claims-Agency Consideration, Pub. L. No. 89-506, § 7, 1966 U.S.C.C.
A.N. (80 Stat. 306) 346, 348.
129 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 cmt. d (1977) (emphasis added).
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shore, the statute began to run as to the harm caused by that particular
wave, and continued for two years. At the end of that two year
period, the opportunity to sue for harm caused by that particular
wave was lost, and so on.
The above analysis, coupled with the rule that an injured party
must generally sue for future damages in successive actions, implies
that damages are limited to those sustained during the period of
limitations immediately prior to the filing of an administrative suit.
Although there is no federal case law that specifically interprets the
statement that "the statute does not run from the time of the first
harm except [as to] the harm then caused,"13 ° federal cases imply
that damages are limited.1 3 ' Additionally, several recent federal
cases rely on state law for the proposition that damages are
limited. 3 '
New York law is clear that damages are limited. The statute of
limitations in New York "for injury to property" is three years.
133 In
Amax, Inc. v. Sohio,13 4 a suit to recover damages for radioactive con-
tamination, the Supreme Court, New York County held that the
storage and disposal of waste was a continuing nuisance.
135 The
court noted, with respect to future damages, that the plaintiff
could sue in successive actions or once and for all. However, "dam-
ages [were] limited to such as were sustained within three years
prior to the commencement of suit."'1
36 In Kearney v. Atlantic Ce-
ment Co.,137 another continuing nuisance case, the Appellate Divi-
130 Id.
131 For example, in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163 (1949), the Supreme Court
rejected the notion that the injured plaintiff had a continuing cause of action with
"each intake of dusty breath." Id. at 170. "[A]pplication of such a rule would, argua-
bly, limit petitioner's damages to that aggravation of his progressive injury traceable
to the last eighteen months of his employment." Id.
132 See, e.g., Nieman v. NLO, Inc., No. 95-3677, 1997 WL 119768, at *14 (6th Cir.
March 19, 1997) (holding, under Ohio law, that plaintiff could recover damages for
continuing trespass, but could "only claim damages incurred within the four years
prior to filing the lawsuit"); Huffman v. United States, 82 F.3d 703, 705 (6th Cir.
1996) (holding, under Kentucky law, that although a temporary nuisance claim was
not barred by the statute of limitations, "recovery would be limited to damages caused
within the limitations period immediately preceding the initiation of the action." (ci-
tation omitted)); In re Tutu Wells Contamination Litigation, 909 F. Supp. 980, 989
(D.C. Virgin Islands 1995) ("the plaintiff will ordinarily be limited to only those past
... injuries which have occurred within the applicable statute of limitations period
immediately before the plaintiff filed his suit").
133 N.Y. C.P.L.R. 214 (McKinney 1990).
134 469 N.Y.S.2d 282 (Sup. Ct. 1983).
135 Id. at 284-85.
136 Id. at 284 (citing 36 N.Y. JUR., LIMITATIONS AND LACHES § 88).
137 306 N.Y.S.2d 45 (App. Div. 1969).
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sion, Third Department stated, "damages are recoverable only to
the extent that they were sustained during the three years immedi-
ately prior to the commencement of the respective actions, plain-
tiffs are not precluded by the statute of limitations from seeking a
permanent injunction or damages in the instant actions."13
Amax and Kearney were relied on by the Rapf court,'39
although this reliance was concededly to determine when the
plaintiffs' cause of action accrued. 4 The Rapf court did not reach
the issue of a limitation of damages. However, equity demands
that the Second Circuit should follow the lead of other circuits and
rely on state law to limit damages. The United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York relied on Rapf on the issue of
when a cause of action accrues, 14' although federal law applied.
Even so, it would seem appropriate for the Eastern District in fu-
ture actions to limit damages.
A successful argument on this point could have a tremendous
impact on the outcome of future cases for the government. For
example, a hypothetical storm causes catastrophic damage on
Long Island's south shore in January, 1994. If plaintiffs filed ad-
ministrative claims 142 for erosion to their properties on January 1,
1996 and tolled the statute of limitations, it would seem that their
opportunity to sue for damages for harms that occurred before
January 1, 1994 would expire. The plaintiffs would be limited to
damages sustained within the two years immediately prior to the
filing of administrative claims (i.e., between January 1, 1994 and
January 1, 1996). This is significant. If the claims filed were proce-
138 Id. at 47 (citations omitted).
139 Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282, 291 (2d Cir. 1985).
140 See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
141 Kennedy v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 1072, 1079 (E.D.N.Y. 1986).
142 The FTCA constitutes a waiver of sovereign immunity, so its terms must be
strictly construed. The FTCA provides that "[a]n action shall not be instituted upon a
claim against the United States ... unless the claimant shall have first presented the
claim to the appropriate [flederal agency . . . ." 28 U.S.C. § 2 6 7 5(a) (1994). The
filing of an administrative claim is a mandatory condition precedent to the filing of a
civil action against the United States for damages arising from the negligent act or
omission of any government employee acting within the scope of his employment.
Melo v. United States, 505 F.2d 1026, 1028 (8th Cir. 1974); Osijo v. United States, 850
F. Supp. 992, 992 (E.D.N.Y. 1993); Kohlbeck v. Kis, 651 F. Supp. 1233, 1236 (D. Mont.
1987). Often plaintiffs file a Standard Form-95 Claim for Damage, Injury, or Death.
The "SF-95" claim form is generally used in such instances, although any claim that
states a sum certain and gives the government agency enough information to investi-
gate the claim is sufficient. GAF Corp. v. United States, 818 F.2d 901, 917 (D.C. Cir.
1987); Avery v. United States, 680 F.2d 608, 610-11 (9th Cir. 1982); Byrne v. United
States, 804 F. Supp. 577, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
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durally defective in some way,1 43 and the defects were not cor-
rected until January 1, 1997, this could limit the damages
recoverable to only those sustained during the two years immedi-
ately preceding this remedial action (i.e., between January 1, 1995
and January 1, 1997), thereby eliminating damages exacerbated by
the January, 1994 storm.144
The federal courts in the Second Circuit should adopt the
State of New York's interpretation on limiting damages because:
(1) the timing of the plaintiffs' filing of administrative claims
might suggest plaintiffs believe they can only sue for damages sus-
tained within the limitations period; (2) this interpretation of the
law on recovery for past harms is consistent with federal law on
recovery for future harms; (3) the FTCA sets a two-year limit in all
cases, 145 and does not make an exception for continuing torts.
VII. A PROPOSAL
One commonly litigated accrual question, arising primarily in
medical malpractice cases, is whether a claim accrues when the
negligent or wrongful acts occur or when the claimant discovers
the material facts underlying the claim. In Kubrick v. United
143 The language of the FTCA spells out four specific requirements concerning the
submission of administrative claims. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2672, 2675 (1994).
These are: (1) the claim must be presented in writing; (2) to the agency out of whose
activities the claim arose; (3) in a sum certain; and (4) within two years of its accrual.
JAYSON, supra note 75, § 17.09[1]. So, for example, a claim would be incomplete if it
did not specify damages. F.G.S. Constructors, Inc. v. Carlow, 823 F. Supp. 1508, 1512
(D.S.D. 1993).
Additionally, a claim must bear an authorized signature. A claim for injury to or
loss of property may be presented by the owner of the property, his duly authorized
agent, or legal representative. 28 C.F.R. § 14.3(a) (1995). If the claim is signed by
the agent or legal representative, it must show the title or legal capacity of the person
signing, and be accompanied by evidence of his/her authority to present a claim on
behalf of the claimant as agent or other representative. Standard Form-95 Claim for
Damage, Injury, or Death, 1995 (available from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
N.Y. District, Office of Counsel, Room 1837, 26 Federal Plaza, New York, N.Y. 10278).
The claims processing regulation requiring evidence of a legal representative's au-
thorization to present a claim is ajurisdictional prerequisite to institute a court action
under the FTCA. Martinez v. United States, 743 F. Supp. 298, 302 (D.NJ. 1990);
Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D.S.C. 1976).
144 Even if the procedural defects in the administrative claims were overlooked,
money damages sought are bound by sum certain limits. Absent new evidence, the
amount of suit may not exceed the total money damages initially sought in a claim.
28 U.S.C. § 2675(b) (1994). See Colin v. United States, 324 F. Supp. 121 (D. Mo.
1970). Hence, money damages are capped at the total stated in a claim or claims (if
there are multiple plaintiffs in a suit).
145 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
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States,'46 a forty-eight year old veteran was treated with the antibi-
otic neomycin for a leg infection in 1968.147 Approximately six
weeks later, he noticed a ringing in his ears and hearing loss.' 4 8 In
1969, a doctor secured his Veteran's Administration ("VA") hospi-
tal records and informed him that it was "highly possible" that his
hearing loss was the result of the neomycin treatment.1 49 The doc-
tor did not say that the treatment was improper. 50 In 1971, a sec-
ond doctor advised Kubrick that the neomycin should not have
been administered. 51  Kubrick filed suit in 1972, alleging that the
VA hospital negligently treated his ailment.1 52 The Third Circuit
held that Kubrick's claim did not accrue until 1971.15' Even
though Kubrick was aware of his injury and the government's re-
sponsibility for it in 1969, his claim did not accrue until he had
reason to know that the VA hospital had breached its duty to
him.1 54 In other words, it was not until 1971 that Kubrick discov-
ered that the acts causing the injury may have constituted medical
malpractice. 55 In so holding, the Third Circuit found plaintiff's
claim to accrue upon his discovery that he was injured, his discov-
ery of the cause of the injury, and his discovery that the injury was
caused by negligence.
1 56
The Supreme Court reversed. The Court held that Kubrick's
claim accrued in 1969, and was thus barred by the two-year statute
of limitations for a tort claim.'5 7 The Court refused to extend the
146 435 F. Supp. 166 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd, 581 F.2d 1092 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444
U.S. 111 (1979).
147 Id. at 168.
148 Id. at 169-70.
149 Id. at 172.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 173.
152 Id. at 174.
153 Kubrick v. United States, 581 F.2d 1092, 1097-98 (3d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 444 U.S.
111 (1979).
154 Id. at 1097.
155 The court followed the reasoning in Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418
(10th Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit stated:
Limitations should not bar a claimant before he has a reasonable basis
for believing he has a claim. Therefore[,] until a claimant has had a
reasonable opportunity to discover all of the essential elements of a pos-
sible cause of action for malpractice-damages, duty, breach[,] and
causation-his claim against the [g]overnment does not accrue. And
where a claimant is given a "credible explanation" of his condition not
pointing to malpractice, he may not be found to have failed to exercise
reasonable diligence because he did not earlier pursue his claim.
Id. at 420-21 (citations omitted).
156 Kubrick, 581 F.2d at 1097.
157 Kubrick v. United States, 444 U.S. 111, 122-23 (1979).
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"blameless ignorance' 15' doctrine to a point where it would protect
the plaintiff until he was aware not only of the injury and its cause,
but also that his legal rights were invaded.' 59 In other words, the
Court did not require Kubrick to demonstrate his knowledge that
the action constituted government negligence. Under Kubrick, a
claim for medical malpractice accrues within the meaning of the
FTCA, at the latest, on the date when the plaintiff knows of, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known of, just the
existence and the cause of his injury. 60 Kubrick effectively nar-
rowed the broader holdings of cases similar to that of the Third
Circuit. To the extent that these cases fix accrual at a point later
than the discovery of injury and cause,161 they are no longer good
law.
Many circuits interpret Kubrick as applying an objective stan-
dard. 16 2 A determination of when the statute begins to run turns
158 The "blameless ignorance" rule was announced in Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S.
163 (1949). It provides that a cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff's
injury manifests itself. Id. at 170-71. In Urie, the plaintiff contracted silicosis while
working as a fireman, id. at 165-66, but his condition was not diagnosed until after he
became too ill to work. Id. at 170. Reluctant to charge Urie with the "unknown and
inherently unknowable," id. at 169, the Court held that because of his "blameless ig-
norance" of the fact of his injury, his cause of action did not accrue until the disease
became apparent. Id. at 170-71.
159 Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-23. The Court stated:
We are unconvinced that for statute of limitations purposes a plaintiff's
ignorance of his legal rights and his ignorance of the fact of his injury
or its cause should receive identical treatment. That he has been in-
jured in fact may be unknown or unknowable until the injury manifests
itself; and the facts about causation may be in the control of the putative
defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very difficult to obtain.
The prospect is not so bleak for a plaintiff in possession of the critical
facts that he has been hurt and who has inflicted the injury. He is no
longer at the mercy of the latter. There are others who can tell him if
he has been wronged, and he need only ask. If he does ask and if the
defendant has failed to live up to minimum standards of medical profi-
ciency, the odds are that a competent doctor will so inform the plaintiff.
Id. at 122.
160 Id. at 120.
161 See Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1268-69 (7th Cir. 1980). The court
stated:
Several courts of appeals, including this one, have recently expanded
the discovery rule to prevent accrual of a claim until a patient has had a
reasonable opportunity to discover each of the elements of a cause of
action-duty, breach, causation, and damages. This expansion was cut
short and back by the Supreme Court in Kubrick. A claim accrues when
a patient acquires possession of the critical facts of injury and cause.
Id. at 1268 n.3 (citations omitted); Dessi v. United States, 489 F. Supp. 722, 724 (E.D.
Va. 1980) (discussing Kubrick, the court stated: "This decision signifies a retreat from
the expansive view of 'accrual' previously adopted by a number of the circuits ....").
162 See, e.g., Herrera-Diaz v. United States Dep't of Navy, 845 F.2d 1534, 1537 (9th
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not on when the plaintiff actually knew of the injury and its cause,
but rather on when "a reasonable person would know enough to
prompt a deeper inquiry into a potential cause... "163 The imple-
mentation of an objective standard would be critical if the Second
Circuit were to adopt the Kubrick discovery rule in FTCA claims for
erosion.
Indeed, many courts have applied the Kubrick discovery rule to
FTCA claims other than malpractice claims.164 Some courts have
even held that Kubrick is not limited to FTCA or medical malprac-
tice cases. 165 Only a few courts have declined to apply Kubrick
outside of the medical malpractice context. 166 The Second Circuit
could apply a modified discovery rule fashioned from Kubrick in
FTCA negligence claims for erosion. 16  Under the FTCA,
"[p]laintiff may not, in effect, hide its head in the sand, ignoring
the accrual of a cause of action until the two-year limitation [s] pe-
riod has expired and then attempt to circumvent the limitation by
alleging a combination of tortious acts or a continuing tort. '"168
The press often writes about the Westhampton groin field
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); Barren v. United States, 839 F.2d 987, 990
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988); Nemmers v. United States, 795 F.2d 628,
631 (7th Cir. 1986), on remand, 681 F. Supp. 567 (C.D. Ill. 1988), affd, 870 F.2d 426
(7th Cir. 1989); Arvayo v. United States, 766 F.2d 1416, 1421-22 (10th Cir. 1985).
Relying on Kubrick, we have developed an objective standard to deter-
mine when a medical malpractice action accrues under the FTCA. The
action accrues, and the statute of limitation starts to run, when a "plain-
tiff has discovered, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should
have discovered, both his injury and its cause."
Herrera-Diaz, 845 F.2d at 1537 (quoting Davis v. United States, 642 F.2d 328, 331 (9th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982)).
163 Nemmers, 795 F.2d at 632. "Our question, then, is whether the running of the
statute of limitations depends on the plaintiffs' personal knowledge and reactions or
whether it depends on the reactions of the objective, 'reasonable' man. The answer is
the latter, an answer reflected in the formula 'knew or should have known."' Id. at
631.
164 See, e.g., Ware v. United States, 626 F.2d 1278 (5th Cir. 1980); Korgel v. United
States, 619 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1980); Alaska Pacific, Inc. v. United States, 650 F. Supp.
29 (D. Nev. 1986), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 846 (1989).
165 See, e.g., Dubose v. Kansas City S. Ry. Co., 729 F.2d 1026, 1031 (5th Cir. 1984)
(applying the Kubrick discovery rule to a case under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C.A. § 56).
166 See, e.g., Steele v. United States, 599 F.2d 823 (7th Cir. 1979).
167 Kent Sinclair and Charles A. Szypszak have proposed that a simple discovery and
reasonable diligence standard, such as that employed in medical malpractice cases
under the FTCA, should govern in all troublesome situations, including continuous
course of conduct cases. Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Action
Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal, 28 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 39 (1991).
168 Lynch v. United States Army, 474 F. Supp. 545, 549 (D.C. Md. 1978) (citing
United Missouri Bank South v. United States, 423 F. Supp. 571, 577 (W.D. Mo.
1976)).
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problems. 169 Presumably a reasonably diligent Long Island resi-
dent would occasionally read the newspaper. 170 A potential plain-
tiff would know of the existence of his/her injury (i.e., the erosion
of his property). A potential plaintiff should also know of its cause
(i.e., allegedly, the Westhampton groin field).
VIII. CONCLUSION
The continually rising costs of litigation over government-
sponsored projects is one likely explanation for the decrease in
federal participation in beach erosion and hurricane protection
projects. In the Second Circuit alone, the government is still in-
volved in litigation stemming from its work on one project com-
pleted in the early 1960s. 171 Because the Second Circuit has
labeled erosion allegedly caused by this project "a continuing tort
for which the cause of action accrues anew each day," 172 the end to
litigation is nowhere in sight.
As an equitable matter, it is important for the Second Circuit
to limit its holding in Rapf to cases involving New York litigants.
The court should also clarify its statement that erosion allegedly
caused by the Westhampton groin field is "a continuing tort for
which the cause of action accrues anew each day." 173 Taken to its
extreme, this statement might mean that if the government has in-
terfered with a wave in any way a new cause of action would conse-
quently accrue each time that wave hits the shore. This
interpretation would expose the government to claims for erosion
associated with projects decades after their completion. The gov-
ernment maintains nearly 100 coastal harbor projects. 174 The
above interpretation of the Second Circuit's holding would create
a tremendous burden for the government and the Corps as it re-
lates to erosion of beachfront property caused by the blockage of
169 See, e.g., newspaper and magazine articles cited supra notes 2, 19, 51, 61; newspa-
per articles cited supra notes 2, 51, 61; see also John A. Black and Jeffrey Kassner,
Protecting Westhampton Beaches, NEWSDAY (Long Island), Apr. 3, 1984, at 50; Jeffrey Kass-
ner and John A. Black, Offering a Solution for Westhampton Beach Erosion, N.Y. TIMES
(L.I.),June 10, 1984, at 30.
170 The fact that the Supreme Court has held that service of process may be ef-
fected through publication can be interpreted as supportive evidence that the Court
assumes that people read the newspaper for at least certain purposes. Shaffer v. Heit-
ner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
171 Rapf v. Suffolk, 755 F.2d 282 (2d Cir. 1985).
172 Id. at 292.
173 Id.
174 SHORELINE PROTECTION AND BEACH EROSION CONTROL TASK FORCE, supra note 6,
at i-ii.
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littoral drift. Plaintiffs in the most recent Second Circuit cases
claimed nearly $300 million in damages.' 75 Claims could be filed
years after a project was constructed. The magnitude for potential
budgetary drain is enormous. As such, government-sponsored
shore protection projects will be eliminated. Those who build on
the beach will be left to fend for themselves when their homes are
swallowed by the ocean. The American public's primary recreation
areas will be reduced to ruins.
175 See supra note 65.
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